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Abstract
The present research examined an underlying psychological process of the effect of
diversity ideologies on prejudice among Whites. In one study, I tested whether colorblindness vs.
multiculturalism affected perceptions of similarity vs. difference, outgroup perspective taking,
and, in turn, prejudice. Using an experimental design, 341 total White participants from both an
undergraduate (n = 151) and non-student adult sample (n = 190) were randomly assigned to a
standard colorblind or multicultural condition. Participants then completed various measures of
perceived similarities vs. differences (visual, interpersonal), outgroup perspective taking
(egocentrism, perspective-taking scenario), and prejudice (explicit racial bias, symbolic racism).
Results suggest the diversity ideology manipulation only had a significant effect on the outgroup
perspective-taking scenario, but the direction of this effect was contrary to hypotheses and
previous findings. Compared to colorblindness, multiculturalism significantly reduced
participants’ likelihood of taking the perspective of a racial outgroup member, with additional
mediation evidence suggesting this effect on reduced outgroup perspective taking, in turn,
indirectly increased explicit racial bias and symbolic racism. Alternative explanations and
additional research considerations are discussed.
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Introduction
In Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools (2007), a landmark legal case on the use of race in
school integration policy, Chief Justice John Roberts declared, “the way to stop discriminating
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” In this statement and many
others across the history of the United States, race is deemed an arbitrary, meaningless social
category that should be ignored. If recognizing race facilitates prejudice, discrimination, and
unequal opportunity in society, ignoring it should increase equality among all individuals. This
reasoning is consistent with the ideal of colorblindness, a diversity ideology that came to
prominence in the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights era. Colorblindness suggests the best way to
achieve intergroup equality is by ignoring racial or ethnic group categories, instead treating
everyone as an individual or recognizing the sameness among people (for reviews, see
Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).
The colorblind approach is largely consistent with years of social psychological theory
(Park & Judd, 2005), including classic research showing the negative consequences of intergroup
categorization (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Researchers have suggested
decategorization—the process of de-emphasizing group categories—may yield more positive
attitudes during interracial interactions because the experience can be more personalized and
individuated, essentially reducing ingroup favoritism and enhancing differentiation among
outgroups members (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Researchers of the recategorization approach
suggest recognizing a common, overarching category (e.g., Americans) instead of distinct
subgroups (e.g., Black-Americans, White-Americans) improves intergroup attitudes because
groups previously perceived to be part of the outgroup are now part of the same ingroup
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Plaut (2002) referred to colorblindness as the sameness model, also
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noting its relevance to early social psychological theory and research on group categorization.
At the same time colorblindness was advanced in the Civil Rights era of the United
States, the notion of multiculturalism was gaining traction as frustration over the progress of
colorblindness stalled. Multiculturalism suggests racial and ethnic group categories should not be
ignored, but recognized and celebrated as important contributions to society (Berry, 1984;
Takaki, 1993; for reviews, see Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).
Like colorblindness, the multicultural approach to intergroup relations also stems from social
psychological theory and research, including aspects of the mutual intergroup differentiation
model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005) and the value-added model (Plaut, 2002; also see Park &
Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2010).
Both colorblindness and multiculturalism are well-intentioned diversity ideologies
because their ultimate goal is reducing inequality among groups. Some research supports this
analysis. Colorblindness and multiculturalism were both found to be hierarchy-attenuating
ideologies due to their negative association with social dominance orientation (Levin et al.,
2012), a belief that “superior” and “inferior” groups should be unequally situated in society
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Despite the colorblind goal to promote a “post-racial society,”
ignoring race is perceptually difficult. Race is such a salient category that people perceive it
within one-seventh of a second, among the fastest dimensions by which people categorize others
(Ito & Urland, 2003; also see Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). What’s
more, some researchers have argued that although its intention is to improve intergroup relations,
colorblindness may perpetuate intergroup bias and inequality (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2003;
Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009).
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Research seems to support this notion, showing that a colorblind ideology predicts
modern racism and belief in a just world (Neville et al., 2000; cf. Levin et al., 2012). When
colorblindness is manipulated among Whites (by having participants read essays on the
intergroup benefits of colorblindness), explicit and implicit pro-White racial bias is greater
compared to multiculturalism (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; but see Correll, Park, & Smith,
2008; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). Colorblindness also makes it difficult for
people to recognize bias and discrimination when it occurs. In classroom settings, children who
were told a story about the importance of recognizing similarities (compared to valuing
differences) were less likely to recognize ambiguous and blatant displays of racial discrimination
in school incidents (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010). During intergroup
interactions, taking a colorblind approach has negative consequences as well. Some majority
group members (e.g., White-Americans) believe ignoring race in interracial interactions is an
effective strategy for appearing less biased, but Black-Americans perceive this colorblind
approach as an indication of greater bias—especially when that interaction is race-relevant.
Whites’ attempts to suppress the recognition of race in these interactions also leads to more
unfriendly nonverbal behaviors because of reduced inhibitory control (Apfelbaum, Sommers, &
Norton, 2008; also see Apfelbaum et al., 2006; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010). Other work suggests
colorblindness effectively suppresses bias momentarily, but the cognitive suppression eventually
rebounds and bias increases (Correll, et al., 2008).
Those who endorse a multicultural ideology, however, are more likely to have positive
attitudes toward racial and ethnic outgroups (Levin et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko, Park,
& Judd, 2006). When multiculturalism is manipulated among majority groups (by having
participants read essays about the intergroup benefits of multiculturalism), evaluations of
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outgroups generally improve and ingroup bias weakens (e.g., compared to colorblindness,
Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; compared to control or assimilation conditions, Correll et al.,
2008; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000). In classroom settings, children who were told a
story about the importance of valuing differences (compared to focusing on similarities) were
more likely to recognize ambiguous and blatant displays of racial discrimination in school
incidents (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). In intergroup interactions, Whites who acknowledge and
recognize race are seen as less biased (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). Thus, this evidence suggests
colorblindness and multiculturalism differentially impact intergroup attitudes and behavior:
colorblindness generally perpetuates or worsens intergroup bias, whereas multiculturalism
reduces it (for reviews, see Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal
& Levy, 2010).
In sum, many researchers over the last two decades have concluded multiculturalism is
the more viable method for reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations. As of yet,
however, little research has addressed how colorblindness and multiculturalism affect prejudice,
an important next step for understanding diversity ideologies and their impact on intergroup
relations. This is the aim of the present work. To better understand the underlying psychological
mechanisms that explain the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on prejudice, I begin
by detailing how these ideologies have typically been operationalized across the experimental
literature.
Current Operationalizations of Colorblindness and Multiculturalism: What Are We Really
Manipulating?
The first manipulation of colorblindness and multiculturalism was proposed by Wolsko
and colleagues (2000). Ever since, it has served as the standard for the majority of
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operationalizations of colorblindness and multiculturalism in the literature (e.g., Correll et al.,
2008; Morrison et al., 2010; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Todd & Galinsky, 2012; Vorauer et
al., 2009; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010, 2011; Wolsko et al., 2000), though not all researchers have
employed this method (e.g., Apfelbaum et al., 2008, Apfelbaum et al. 2010; Kauff et al., 2013;
Levin et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2005). Participants read an essay suggesting prominent scholars
believe the best way to achieve intergroup harmony is by adopting a colorblind or multicultural
approach in life. As such, when examining the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on
intergroup attitudes and behavior, it is important to understand what—exactly—this procedure is
manipulating.
A close examination of the original materials of Wolsko and colleagues (2000) suggests a
variety of diversity models are embedded within the colorblindness and multiculturalism essays.
The colorblindness essay argues we must “see each person as an individual,” paralleling the
decategorization approach (Brewer & Miller, 1984). But it also includes phrases such as, “we are
all citizens of the United States” that should be seen as “part of the larger group, ‘Americans.’”
This parallels the recategorization approach of the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000). Thus, colorblindness has most often been operationalized as a combination of
two separate approaches, decategorization and recategorization, to reducing intergroup bias (for
reviews, see Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2002).
Like colorblindness, the multiculturalism essay includes several diversity models
embedded within it as well. Paralleling the mutual intergroup differentiation model, phrases such
as “recognizing this diversity” and “we validate the identity of each group and recognize its
existence” focus on the recognition of group differences (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Moreover,
phrases such as “each ethnic group within the United States can contribute in its own unique

6
way” and “each group has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging
both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group” parallel the valueadded and multimodal models of diversity (for reviews, see Brown & Hewstone, 2005;
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2002). These focus on the value of
distinct groups in society and their ability to contribute in unique, but inherently different, ways.
Of particular importance is how the multiculturalism essay by Wolsko and colleagues (2000)
ends, that is, “understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an
essential component of long-term social harmony in the United States.” Given the majority of the
multiculturalism essay focuses on recognizing difference and allowing distinct groups to
contribute differently, this focus on both the similarities and difference is worth noting (see Park
& Judd, 2005). It is not clear how individuals are responding to operationalizations of group
difference alongside a focus on similarities. In some ways, it is reminiscent of the dual-identity
approach to intergroup relations (e.g., Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Gaertner, Dovidio, &
Bachman, 1996; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; also see Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), a modest
reformulation of the recategorization-based common ingroup identity model (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000). The dual-identity model focuses on a common superordinate group (e.g.,
Americans) alongside distinct groups (e.g., White- and Black-Americans), wherein the former
represents overarching similarity and the latter intergroup difference.
From this analysis, the majority of operationalizations of colorblindness and
multiculturalism are not “pure” manipulations; they are “hybrid” combinations of various
diversity models employed throughout the intergroup relations literature. While each diversity
model discussed has independently been shown to have positive outcomes for intergroup
relations (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Brown & Hewstone, 2005;
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Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), it is not clear what psychological processes are being influenced and
how they are affecting prejudice when multiple models are combined together. Below, I discuss
various operationalizations of colorblindness and multiculturalism in more depth, with the aim of
conceptualizing an overarching focus of colorblindness and multiculturalism. In other words,
what focus is most salient in colorblind vs. multicultural ideals?
Conceptualizing Colorblindness and Multiculturalism: A Focus on Similarities vs.
Differences
Arguably the most overarching component of colorblindness is a focus on the similarity
or “sameness” among people and an avoidance of any intergroup distinctions such as race,
ethnicity, or culture (Neville, Awad, Brooks, Flores, & Bluemel, 2013; also see Rosenthal &
Levy, 2010; Plaut, 2010). The materials of Wolsko and colleagues (2000) state, “If we can
recognize our ‘sameness’ we will be able to rechannel… resources to work on difficult and
important other problems within our society [rather than interethnic conflict].” In other words,
the apparent differences among people should be ignored in favor of their similarities. A
somewhat distinct but related operationalization of colorblindness is a component of
assimilation, such that any ethnic or cultural identities adopted by minority groups should be
abandoned in favor of the dominant culture (e.g., Neville et al., 2000). Like the similarity
component of colorblindness, assimilation argues for little to no distinctions among groups in
society (Hahn, Banchefsky, Park, & Judd, 2015). In each case—and whatever the particular
group distinction (e.g., race, ethnicity, culture)—both the similarity and assimilationist
components can be subsumed under a broader “sameness” category, in which group differences
are ignored in favor of similarity.
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A third and final operationalization of colorblindness has focused on the individual as a
unique person or human being (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). This focus on individuality parallels
the decategorization process, in which stripping people of their group membership in favor of
individual qualities improves intergroup attitudes (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Most
operationalizations of colorblindness have mixed the similarity and individuality components
together, but when examining the materials of Wolsko and colleagues (2000) closely, it is clear
the “uniqueness” component is subsumed by the broader component of similarity: “We must
look beyond skin color and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual
who is part of the larger group, ‘Americans’” [emphasis added]. In other words, while people
are unique individuals, ultimately there is some similar, overarching category binding them
together (also see Plaut, 2002). As such, I conceptualize the ideology of colorblindness as
possessing an overarching focus on similarities.
Like colorblindness, operationalizations of multiculturalism have focused on three
components. The most overarching component of multiculturalism is a focus on the differences
among people, particularly regarding group memberships such as race, ethnicity, or culture.
These group differences are seen not as nuisance variables that should be ignored, but important
distinctions in society that should be recognized (Plaut, 2002, 2010). Another operationalization
of multiculturalism involves not only recognizing group differences, but appreciating and
valuing the contributions various racial, ethnic, or cultural groups have made to society (Plaut,
2002; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Appreciation of group differences extends beyond merely
recognizing those differences, and while recognition indicates at least some form of awareness,
appreciation underscores the perceived value of intergroup diversity. A third operationalization
of multiculturalism has focused on the right of minority groups to maintain their cultural
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traditions and distinctiveness—even if doing so contrasts with the dominant or majority culture
(Berry & Kalin, 1995; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).
These operationalizations of multiculturalism are each evident in the original
manipulation of Wolsko and colleagues (2000), including “recognizing diversity,” allowing
“each ethnic group” to “contribute in its own unique way,” and acknowledging that “different
cultural groups…provide a richness in food, dress, music, art…” Though relatively distinct, these
various operationalizations of multiculturalism are all based on the desire to recognize the
importance of racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. Without recognizing the importance of group
differences, one cannot appreciate the contributions of different racial, ethnic, or cultural groups.
Moreover, without recognizing group differences, one cannot believe in the right of groups to
maintain their distinctiveness in society. As such, I conceptualize the ideology of
multiculturalism as possessing an overarching focus on differences over similarities.
If colorblindness generally focuses on similarities and multiculturalism on differences,
what downstream psychological processes might these orientations affect? In the following
section, I discuss the influence of perceived similarities and differences on social comparison and
perspective-taking processes.
Similarities, Differences, and Perspective Taking
When people make social judgments or evaluations, they typically do so in a comparative
fashion (e.g., Festinger, 1954). Evaluations are not made in a vacuum; they are made in relation
to other things, people, or contexts. The selective accessibility model (for a review, see
Mussweiler, 2003) suggests such evaluations arise from a series of comparisons between a target
(e.g., the self) and a standard (e.g., another person). Before this comparison can occur, however,
an initial, focal assessment must be carried out: are the target and standard generally more
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similar or dissimilar to one another? An overall assessment can be reached spontaneously based
on several factors, including category membership, psychological closeness, or extremity, just to
name a few. If the target and standard share the same category membership (e.g., gender, race),
or if there is high psychological closeness between the target and standard, a series of similarityoriented hypotheses are likely to be tested to confirm whether the target and standard are indeed
similar. If the target and standard have extreme features, however, a series of difference-oriented
hypotheses are likely to be tested to confirm their dissimilarity. An initial, holistic assessment of
similarity or dissimilarity can also be experimentally manipulated by priming individuals to be in
one mindset or another (for a review, see Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2009).
In either case, this holistic assessment of perceived similarity or dissimilarity engenders a
series of comparisons that increase the accessibility of information consistent with the initial
assessment. If the target and standard were initially judged to be similar, knowledge consistent
with this judgment is selectively searched for and tested. If the target and standard were initially
judged to be dissimilar, however, knowledge highlighting inconsistencies between the target and
standard are selectively searched for and tested. All the while, this comparative process increases
the accessibility of target-standard similarities or differences, and the accessibility of this
information ultimately becomes integrated into an evaluation of the target (e.g., Mussweiler &
Strack, 2000; Mussweiler, 2003). In one study, for example, participants read about a student
(the standard) struggling or succeeding in their transition to college. Those who were
experimentally primed to focus on similarities judged their own college transition as more
successful in the “succeeding” compared to the “struggling” condition. Those primed to focus on
differences, however, judged their own college transition as less successful in the “succeeding”
condition compared to the “struggling” condition (Mussweiler, 2001b).
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When people focus on similarities and test hypotheses consistent with this holistic
assessment, subsequent evaluations of the target move closer to that of the standard. But when
people focus on differences and test hypotheses consistent with this assessment, evaluations of
the target move farther away from the standard. As such, this similarity effect has been termed
assimilation and the difference effect contrast (Mussweiler, 2003). In general, initial judgments
of similarity and subsequent evaluations of assimilation are typically the default assessment. This
is partly because similarity-focused comparisons are faster and more efficient to process than
difference-focused comparisons (Corcoran, Epstude, Damisch, & Mussweiler, 2011).
Importantly, the underlying comparative processes outlined by the selective accessibility model
have implications for a related social comparison process: psychological perspective taking.
Epley and colleagues (2004) suggest the process of perspective taking—intuiting the
mind or imagining the viewpoint of another person—functions similarly to the anchoring and
adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Here, the perspective of the self is used as a
cognitive anchor to estimate the perspective of another, and is in line with the finding that the
self is often used as an initial point of comparison when evaluating another person (e.g., Dunning
& Hayes, 1996). The self-generated anchor undergoes a series of adjustments to reflect the most
plausible estimate of another’s perspective; when this estimate falls within an implicit range of
possible perspectives, adjustment stops (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2006). Because the most
automatic and accessible source of information when judging another’s perspective is the
perspective of the self, estimates of another’s perspective fall closer to the self-generated anchor.
Thus, chronically underestimating the plausibility of another person’s perspective is the rule
rather than the exception (for a review, see Epley, 2008), suggesting egocentrism is our default
cognitive process. In effect, we overestimate the perceived similarity between how we see the
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world and how others see the world.
In one study by Epley and colleagues (2004), participants listened to a voicemail
ostensibly left on an answering machine, in which the caller discussed his thoughts about the
quality of a comedian they saw earlier in the week. The voicemail was otherwise ambiguous and
could be interpreted as either sarcastic or sincere. Participants were given privileged information
prior to hearing the voicemail that provided background knowledge to the caller’s intentions.
Participants recognized someone without this knowledge would be less certain about the
intention of the caller, and therefore participants adjusted how a listener might perceive the call.
The key finding of the study was that participants did not adjust far enough away from how the
privileged information influenced their own perspective of the call. This insufficient adjustment,
in turn, caused participants to judge the perceptions of an uninformed listener as closer to how
they perceived the call themselves.
Much theory and research has long investigated the bi-directional effect of perspective
taking and perceived similarity (e.g., Stotland, 1969), including studies showing perspective
taking increases perceived closeness and self-other overlap (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce,
1996; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Laurent & Myers, 2011). Other research, however, has
suggested perceptions of difference and a focus on the other are integral parts of the perspectivetaking process. For instance, cross-cultural research has suggested collectivist cultures, despite
being more interdependent, are better at perspective taking than individualistic cultures (cf.
Chopik, O’Brien, & Konrath, 2016). This is not because interdependent individuals see
themselves as more similar to others, but because they are more other-oriented (Wu & Keysar,
2007).
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Moreover, if the process of perspective taking uses the self’s perspective as an anchor
that is subsequently adjusted to represent another’s perspective, sufficient adjustment should be
less likely to occur when the perspective of the self and the perspective of another are already
perceived to be similar (Epley, 2008). In other words, perceived similarity should thwart
adjustment because the perspective of the self is a reasonable enough anchor at which to begin
and end. Perceptions of difference, however, should extend this anchoring and adjustment
process. As stated by Epley and colleagues (2004), “when others are known to be in different
situations, from different backgrounds, or in possession of different knowledge, such naïve
realism is untenable. In these cases, … it is clear from the outset that one’s perspective is not
shared and adjustment is required” (p. 337).
Based on this reasoning, perceived similarity should foster more egocentric perspective
taking, whereas perceived difference should facilitate more other-oriented perspective taking.
Indeed, Todd and colleagues (2011) argue a focus on self-other differences engenders more
accurate, other-oriented perspective taking, whereas a focus on self-other similarities engenders
egocentrism. Egocentrism, in essence, is assimilation of another person’s perspective with the
perspective of the self. Their research has shown a focus on differences increased the likelihood
of taking the visual perspective of another person (Study 1) and decreased the likelihood of
projecting privileged knowledge onto how an uninformed person would interpret an ambiguous
email (Study 2). Even when a focus on differences is not explicitly manipulated, people are
likely to spontaneously adopt a difference focus when exposed to ethnic outgroup members
(Study 5) because they are salient points of comparison to the ingroup (also see Corcoran &
Mussweiler, 2009; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002; Mussweiler, 2003). Together, these
findings not only suggest a focus on similarities vs. differences has implications for the
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efficaciousness of perspective-taking processes, but that merely recognizing the membership of
different outgroups can be an antecedent to focusing on differences (and ultimately facilitating
perspective taking).
The Impact of Diversity Ideologies on Prejudice through Perspective Taking
Given my conceptualization of colorblindness as similarity-focused and multiculturalism
as difference-focused, I hypothesize colorblindness and multiculturalism should differentially
impact perspective-taking processes through perceptions of similarity vs. difference,
respectively. The colorblind notion that all individuals are essentially the same and racial/ethnic
group differences are unimportant should thwart adjustments beyond the self-generated anchor,
leading to egocentrism. In contrast, the multicultural notion that racial/ethnic group differences
must be recognized and appreciated should facilitate greater adjustments beyond the selfgenerated anchor, leading to a more accurate perception of another’s perspective. Previous
research supports this line of thinking and comes from two different labs. Vorauer and
colleagues (2009) showed multiculturalism (compared to a colorblind condition) engenders a
more outward, other-oriented focus when interacting with a member of a different ethnic group
(Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009). Todd and Galinsky (2012) demonstrated that
multiculturalism increases self-reported perspective taking (compared to colorblindness and
control conditions, which did not differ; Study 1), increases tendencies to take the visual
perspective of a Black man (compared to colorblindness; Study 2), and decreases egocentric
responses when participants guessed how an outgroup member would interpret an ambiguous
email from a co-worker, about which the participant received privileged information (Study 3;
also see Sparkman, Eidelman, Dueweke, Marin, & Dominguez, in press).
Although such research tests the differential impact of colorblindness and
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multiculturalism on perspective taking, it is unclear whether this effect occurs through a
similarity vs. difference focus. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the long-studied effects of
colorblindness and multiculturalism on prejudice are mediated through perspective taking.
Perspective taking has been shown to be a powerful tool for prejudice reduction, not only
predicting but causally leading to less prejudice (for a review, see Todd & Galinsky, 2014).
Individual differences in perspective taking predict less prejudice (Sparkman & Blanchar, 2017;
Sparkman & Eidelman, 2016), and directly taking the perspective of an outgroup target lessens
prejudice toward the entire group (Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 2004; Vescio,
Sechrist, Paolucci, 2003). In other areas of intergroup relations research, such as intergroup
contact theory (Allport, 1954), perspective taking has been shown to be among the strongest
mediators for prejudice reduction (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).
But for all we have learned about colorblindness and multiculturalism, we still know
relatively little about what is happening inside the minds of individuals when considering
colorblindness and multiculturalism, and how these diversity ideologies affect prejudice. The
present research attempts to answer these questions.
Overview of the Present Research
In one study, I examined whether colorblindness and multiculturalism affect prejudice
through a serial mediation process involving (1) a focus on similarities vs. differences and (2)
outgroup perspective taking. Using an experimental design, participants were randomly assigned
to a colorblind or multicultural condition using the standard manipulation of Wolsko and
colleagues (2000). I first examined the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on
perception of similarities vs. differences, measured by both a visual and interpersonal judgment
task. I also examined the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on the willingness to take
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the perspective of a racial outgroup member, measured by both an egocentrism task and
imagined perspective-taking scenario. I also examined the effect of colorblindness and
multiculturalism on prejudice, operationalized as both explicit racial bias and symbolic racism.
Together, I hypothesized that (compared to the colorblindness condition) multiculturalism would
increase perceptions of difference (relative to similarities), increase outgroup perspective taking,
and decrease prejudice. I also hypothesized that these effects should occur in a particular order
and underlying process. Compared to colorblindness, the effect of multiculturalism on increased
perceptions of difference should, in turn, facilitate greater outgroup perspective taking that, in
turn, should reduce prejudice.
The current research makes three contributions to the literature. First, manipulating
diversity ideologies and examining their effect on perceptions of similarity vs. difference may
provide important information about what is most salient following typical social psychological
manipulations of colorblindness and multiculturalism, most notably the hybrid approach used by
Wolsko and colleagues (2000). Second, examining the effect of colorblindness and
multiculturalism on perceptions of similarity vs. difference may uncover an underlying
mechanism explaining previous effects of diversity ideologies on perspective taking (e.g., Todd
& Galinsky, 2012). Third, examining whether colorblindness and multiculturalism impact
perceptions of similarity vs. difference and, in turn, outgroup perspective taking may
demonstrate an underlying psychological mechanism explaining the long-studied effects of
diversity ideologies on prejudice.
Method
Participants. A priori 95% power analyses indicated a total sample of 210 participants
would be needed to detect an estimated medium effect size of d = 0.50 at p < .05 for the effect of
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diversity ideologies on perceptions of similarity vs. difference. Based on previous research, a
prior 95% power analyses indicated (1) a total sample of 96 participants would be needed to
detect the reported effect size of d = 0.75 at p < .05 for the effect of diversity ideologies on
outgroup egocentrism (Study 4; Todd & Galinsky, 2012), (2) a total sample of 210 participants
would be needed to detect the reported effect size of d = 0.50 at p < .05 for the effect of diversity
ideologies on self-reported perspective taking (Study 1; Todd & Galinsky, 2012), and (3) a total
sample of 196 participants would be needed to detect the reported effect size of d = 0.52 at p <
.05 for the effect of diversity ideologies on explicit racial bias (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004).
Given published effect sizes in the psychological literature are likely inflated (Szucs & Ioannidis,
2017) and high-powered replication attempts suggest published effects sizes are approximately
twice the size as replication effect sizes (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), I decided to
substantially increase (roughly double in size) the required sample estimated by a prior power
analyses.
A desired sample size of 400 non-Hispanic White undergraduates was sought from the
University of Arkansas’ general psychology subject pool, and participation was compensated
with partial fulfillment of a course requirement (see Appendix F for research compliance
approval). At the end of the semester-long data collection attempt, however, only 176 of the 400
participants (55% female; 95% monoracial White; Mage = 19.36 years old, SD = 1.61) were
recruited in the study. To supplement this sample size, 220 non-Hispanic White participants
(58% female; 94% monoracial White; Mage = 37.10 years old, SD = 12.33) from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were recruited and compensated $1.45 for their time. The
undergraduate and MTurk samples were then combined, but also analyzed separately for
potential differences. Twenty-two participants who did not identify as White, 14 participants
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who failed an attention check (“This is an attention check. Please select ‘strongly agree’ for your
answer.”), and 19 participants who provided a response more than three standard deviations from
the mean on any dependent measure were all excluded from the analysis. This left a final sample
of 341 participants for analyses (50% female; 100% monoracial White; Mage = 29.36 years old,
SD = 12.85).
Procedure. The study took approximately fifteen minutes and was advertised to be about
how reading brief essays in the social sciences might be related to other thoughts and social
attitudes. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
essay conditions (colorblindness vs. multiculturalism), as done in Wolsko and colleagues (2000).
Following this, participants responded to the primary dependent measures of perceived
similarities vs. differences (visual, interpersonal), outgroup perspective taking (egocentrism task,
perspective-taking scenario), and prejudice (explicit racial bias, symbolic racism). The items of
each individual measure were randomized within-block, each type of measure was randomized
within-block (e.g., the presentation of visual and interpersonal similarities vs. differences was
randomized), and each category of measure was randomized between-block (i.e., the
presentation of perceived similarities vs. differences, outgroup perspective taking, and prejudice
were all randomized). Following the dependent measures, participants provided demographic
information (political orientation, age, gender, and race/ethnicity) and were then thanked and
compensated appropriately.
Manipulating colorblindness vs. multiculturalism. Participants in the colorblind
condition read an essay suggesting, “Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political
scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the United States,” and that “in
order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first and
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foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United States” (see Wolsko et al.,
2000). The essay goes on to suggest intergroup conflict can be overcome by recognizing our
“sameness” and seeing ourselves as “parts of a larger whole” (see Appendix A1). In the
multiculturalism condition, participants read the same beginning essay indicating interethnic
issues are a #1 concern for the United States, but then diverged from the colorblind essay to
suggest that “recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and
complementarity among the various ethnic groups” (see Appendix B1).
On the following page, participants were asked to reflect on the issue of interethnic
relations (in order to make their views more accessible) by listing four reasons why “a
unification among all ethnic groups could potentially strengthen the United States”
(colorblindness: Appendix A2) or four reasons why “multiculturalism is a positive asset that
could potentially strengthen the United States” (multiculturalism: Appendix B2). Finally, and in
line with Wolsko and colleagues (2000), participants were given a list of 21 responses for this
task—ostensibly written by other participants—and asked to select which ones sounded most
like their own. Colorblindness responses included, for example, “A sense of patriotism when
people are in one group,” “Less violence,” and “Better sense of national pride” (Appendix A3);
whereas multiculturalism responses included, “Learn new cultures,” “Minorities don’t feel that
they are unimportant,” and “Enables the settling of future immigrants” (Appendix B3).
Dependent variables. To provide a rather broad measure of each dependent variable
(perceptions of similarity vs. difference, outgroup perspective taking, prejudice), two
operationalizations of each construct were used.
Perceptions of similarity vs. difference.
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Visual judgments. A person’s comparative focus—either on similarities or differences—
can be surmised by providing a pair of pictures and asking whether they appear more similar to
or different from one another. Previous research (Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler, Rüter, &
Epstude, 2004) suggests that one’s informational focus on similarities or differences extends to
subsequent comparisons, even if such comparisons are directly unrelated (for a review, see
Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2009). The picture pairs need only have a relatively equal number of
similar and different qualities. Participants were told to take several minutes to carefully inspect
and compare three pairs of pictures, one pair taken directly from Markman & Gentner (1996),
one pair taken from email correspondence with T. Mussweiler (personal communication, August
21, 2014), and one from the internet. After inspecting each picture pair, participants rated them
on the same 1 (very similar) to 9 (very dissimilar) scale. All responses were combined and
averaged to provide an index of one’s visual similarity vs. difference (α = .66), with higher scores
indicating more dissimilarity.
Interpersonal judgments. For the undergraduate sample only, participants also evaluated
themselves relative to a college student, Christiane, who was adjusting well to her transition to
the University of Arkansas (Appendix C).1 Participants were instructed to read the passage
attentively and form an impression of Christiane. After reading the passage, and in line with
Mussweiler (2001b), participants were asked to compare themselves to Christiane and answer,
“How difficult was it for you to make this comparison?” on a 1 (very difficult) to 9 (very easy)
scale. Critically, they were asked two objective questions (rather than subjective questions; see
Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) assessing self-evaluations of their
adjustment to college, “How often do you typically go out per month?” and “How many friends
do you have in Fayetteville?” These self-evaluations were only weakly correlated, r = .17, p =
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.04; and thus analyzed as separate interpersonal judgments. Self-evaluations that suggest going
out more times per month and having more friends in Fayetteville indicate greater perceived
similarity to Christiane’s experience (i.e., assimilation), whereas going out fewer times per
month and having fewer friends indicate greater perceived difference from Christiane (i.e.,
contrast).
Correlations between measures. The visual and interpersonal judgments were relatively
independent measures of perceived similarity vs. difference: visual judgments were uncorrelated
with “night out” interpersonal judgments, r = .06, p = .47; and “number of friend” interpersonal
judgments, r = .07, p = .40.
Outgroup perspective taking.
Egocentrism task. In a procedure used by Todd and colleagues (2011, 2012) that was
originally based on work by Keysar (1994), participants read about an exchange between two
presumably Black coworkers, Tyrone and DeShawn (Appendix D). In this exchange, Tyrone
asks DeShawn for a new restaurant recommendation, which Tyrone eats at later in the evening.
The participant is then provided privileged information suggesting Tyrone did not enjoy the
restaurant. The following day, Tyrone sends an ambiguously worded email to DeShawn, “About
the restaurant, it was marvelous, just marvelous.” With no other information provided,
participants were asked “How do you think DeShawn interpreted Tyrone’s email?,” with
responses ranging on a 1 (very sarcastic) to 9 (very sincere) scale. For ease of interpretation,
responses to this item were later reverse-scored.
This egocentrism task is an adult version of the traditional false belief, or “displacement,”
task used to assess theory of mind in young children (for a review, see Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001). Just as young children must withhold their privileged knowledge when
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estimating the perspective of a naïve target, adult participants must prevent their privilege
knowledge (that Tyrone did not enjoy the restaurant) from influencing their estimate of
DeShawn’s perspective. Judging DeShawn’s interpretation of the email as more sarcastic
suggests overreliance on one’s privileged knowledge of Tyrone’s dislike of the restaurant—
which DeShawn could not possibly know. Judging DeShawn’s interpretation as more sincere
indicates a less egocentric perception of DeShawn’s perspective. To create a more reliable
measure, 3 additional questions were asked on similar 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)
scales, including “DeShawn could tell that Tyrone was upset about the restaurant, “DeShawn
could tell that Tyrone did not enjoy the restaurant,” and “DeShawn could tell that Tyrone was
satisfied with the restaurant” (reverse-scored). All responses were combined and averaged to
provide an index of egocentrism (α = .89), with higher scores indicating more egocentrism.
Perspective-taking scenario. Previous research (Todd & Galinsky, 2012) suggests
manipulating colorblindness vs. multiculturalism increased self-reported tendencies of
perspective taking, as measured by the perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). To build on this finding, participants were shown an image
of a Black male target taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink,
2015). They were instructed to “imagine you are having a disagreement with the person in the
photograph above. Imagine they are pretty upset and trying to explain where they are coming
from. Take a few moments to put yourself in this situation. Really try to think about what this
experience would be like and how you would respond.” This page was presented for a total of 35
seconds, during which participants could not advance to the next page until an automatically
generated arrow appeared on the screen. Following this prompt, participants completed the
perspective-taking subscale of the IRI, with all 7 items reframed to be about what participants
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would do in this situation (e.g., “I would find it difficult to see things from this person’s
perspective” [reverse-scored], “I would try to better understand this person by imagining how
things look from their perspective;” see Appendix E). All items ranged on a 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree) scale, and responses were combined and averaged to provide an index of
the perspective-taking scenario (α = .87). Higher scores indicate greater perspective taking of the
Black target.
Correlations between measures. The egocentrism task and perspective-taking scenario
were also relatively independent measures of outgroup perspective taking, though they were
weakly and negatively correlated, r = –.09, p = .10.
Prejudice.
Explicit racial bias. To measure explicit racial bias, participants self-reported their
evaluations of four racial groups (Whites, Blacks/African-Americans, Asians, and Latinos) on a
0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm) feeling thermometer scale, a common technique for measuring
explicit intergroup attitudes (e.g., see the American National Election Studies, General Social
Survey, and World Values Survey). Difference scores were computed by taking the reported
warmth toward Blacks, Asians, and Latinos and individually subtracting them from reported
warmth toward Whites. These difference scores were then combined and averaged to provide an
index of explicit racial bias (α = .88), with positive and larger values indicating more pro-White
racial bias.
Symbolic racism. To capture a more nuanced form of prejudice, the symbolic racism
scale (Henry and Sears, 2002) was used. Symbolic racism is argued to reflect a more subtle and
abstract form of prejudice among Whites against Blacks, including beliefs that racial prejudice
and discrimination are no longer issues, that Blacks are demanding too much from society and
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may even be experiencing advantages from such demands, and that any disadvantages
experienced by Blacks are a function of their own unwillingness to take responsibility for their
lives. The scale includes eight items (e.g., “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities
overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same,” and “Over the past
few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve” [reverse-scored]), each answered on
various 1 (strongly disagree, not pushed fast enough, not much at all, none at all) to 7 (strongly
agree, pushed too fast, all of it, a lot) scales, depending on question wording. Responses were
combined and averaged to provide an index of symbolic racism (α = .90), with higher scores
indicating more symbolic racism.
Correlations between measures. The explicit racial bias and symbolic racism measures
were moderately and positively correlated, r = .40, p < .001.
Results
Sample descriptives. On a 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) scale—with 4 being
the midpoint—the overall political orientation of the sample was slightly left-of-center (M =
3.75, SD = 1.88). However, the MTurk sample was significantly more liberal (M = 3.53, SD =
1.94) than the undergraduate sample, which was near the mid-point of the scale (M = 4.04, SD =
1.77), t(339) = 2.52, p = .01. Overall, participants saw the picture pairs as somewhat more
similar than different (M = 3.97, SD = 1.42), perceptions that did not differ by sample, t(339) =
1.03, p = .30. Regarding interpersonal perceptions of similarity vs. difference, undergraduate
participants reported going out approximately six nights per month (M = 5.78, SD = 3.95) and
having approximately 30 friends (M = 30.23, SD = 31.45) in Fayetteville (data were not collected
for the MTurk sample). Regarding outgroup perspective taking, participants overall reported
relatively high levels of perspective taking toward the Black target (M = 5.62, SD = 0.88),
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regardless of sample, t(339) = 1.01, p = .31, and displayed somewhat low levels of egocentrism
(M = 3.70, SD = 1.89). However, the undergraduate sample displayed significantly more
egocentrism (M = 3.98, SD = 1.88) than the MTurk sample (M = 3.48, SD = 1.88), t(339) = 2.45,
p = .02. Regarding prejudice, participants overall reported slight disagreement with symbolically
racist statements (M = 3.35, SD = 1.30), regardless of sample, t(339) = –0.86, p = .39; but a slight
pro-White racial bias (M = 6.01, SD = 14.79). The undergraduate sample reported significantly
more pro-White racial bias (M = 8.09, SD = 13.68) than the MTurk sample (M = 4.35, SD =
15.46), t(338) = 2.33, p = .02.
Correlations among primary variables. As shown in Table 1, perceiving greater
differences among several pairs of pictures was uncorrelated with egocentrism but negatively
correlated with taking the perspective of the Black target in the perspective-taking scenario.
However, among the undergraduate sample, interpersonal judgments of a fellow college student
were uncorrelated with both egocentrism and responses in the perspective-taking scenario.
Perceiving greater differences among pairs of pictures and interpersonal judgments of going out
more times per month were both positively correlated with explicit racial bias and symbolic
racism (judgments of how many friends one has were uncorrelated with all measures). Finally,
whereas egocentrism was uncorrelated with explicit racial bias and symbolic racism, taking the
perspective of a Black target in the perspective-taking scenario was negatively correlated with
explicit racial bias and symbolic racism.
Primary hypotheses. I hypothesize that, compared to the colorblindness condition,
participants in the multiculturalism condition will perceive the picture pairs as more dissimilar
than similar. Among the undergraduate sample, I hypothesize participants in the multiculturalism
condition (compared to colorblindness) will contrast their own adjustment to college from
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Christiane’s, evidenced by self-evaluations of going out fewer times per month and having fewer
friends in Fayetteville. I also hypothesize that, compared to the colorblindness condition,
participants in the multiculturalism condition will judge DeShawn’s interpretation of Tyrone’s
email as more sincere (suggesting less egocentrism) and report greater likelihood of taking the
perspective of a Black target in a perspective-taking scenario. I also hypothesize that, compared
to the colorblindness condition, participants in the multiculturalism condition will report less
explicit racial bias and symbolic racism. Finally, I hypothesize that this effect of multiculturalism
on reduced prejudice will be serially mediated by greater perceptions of difference (relative to
similarity) and, in turn, greater outgroup perspective taking.
Main effects. First, to examine the overall effect of the diversity ideology manipulation
on perceptions of similarity vs. difference, outgroup perspective taking, and prejudice, a series of
independent samples t-tests were conducted on the primary dependent variables. For descriptive
statistics and results of all t-tests, see Table 2 for the full sample, Table 3 for the undergraduate
sample, and Table 4 for the MTurk sample.
Perceptions of similarity vs. difference. Results suggest the diversity ideology
manipulation had no significant effect on the visual judgments, t(339) = –0.92, p = .36; and
remained non-significant whether examining the undergraduate, t(149) = –0.52, p = .60; or
MTurk sample, t(188) = –0.78, p = .44. The diversity ideology manipulation also did not interact
with sample type on the visual judgments, F(1, 337) = 0.04, ηp2 < .001, p = .84. Among the
undergraduate sample, results suggest the diversity ideology manipulation also had no significant
effect on the interpersonal judgments, number of nights out per month: t(149) = –0.62, p = .54;
number of friends in Fayetteville: t(149) = 0.66, p = .51.
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Outgroup perspective taking. The diversity ideology manipulation had no significant
effect on the egocentrism task, t(339) = –0.61, p = .54; and remained non-significant whether
examining the undergraduate, t(149) = 0.60, p = .55; or MTurk sample, t(188) = –1.42, p = .16.
The diversity ideology manipulation also did not interact with sample type on egocentrism, F(1,
337) = 1.94, ηp2 = .01, p = .17. There was an effect of the diversity ideology manipulation on the
perspective-taking scenario, but in a direction contrary to hypotheses and previous findings.
Compared to the colorblindness condition, participants in the multiculturalism condition were
significantly less likely to take the perspective of the Black target in the scenario, t(339) = 3.52,
p < .001. While the effect on responses in the perspective-taking scenario was significant for the
MTurk sample, t(188) = 3.24, p = .001; and not the undergraduate sample, t(149) = 1.57, p = .12;
the results were in similar directions and the interaction between condition and sample type was
not significant, F(1, 337) = 1.27, ηp2 = .004, p = .26.
Prejudice. The diversity ideology manipulation had no significant effect on explicit racial
bias, t(338) = –0.43, p = .67; or symbolic racism, t(339) = –0.93, p = .36. These non-significant
effects remained whether examining the undergraduate, explicit racial bias: t(149) = –0.33, p =
.74; symbolic racism: t(149) = 0.08, p = .94; or MTurk sample, explicit racial bias: t(187) =
–0.34, p = .74; symbolic racism: t(188) = –1.11, p = .27. The diversity ideology manipulation did
not interact with sample type on either explicit racial bias, F(1, 336) < 0.001, ηp2 < .001, p > .99;
or symbolic racism, F(1, 337) = 0.80, ηp2 = .002, p = .37.
Mediation. The only significant effect of the manipulation of colorblindness vs.
multiculturalism was on the perspective-taking scenario. Because this measure represented one
of the proposed mediators (i.e., outgroup perspective taking), I proceeded to test for evidence of
an independent—rather than serial—indirect effect of diversity ideologies on prejudice through
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outgroup perspective taking. In the past, statisticians have argued (via the causal steps approach;
Baron & Kenny, 1986) that evidence of mediation can only be justified if the independent
variable directly impacts the outcome variable. More recently, however, researchers and
statisticians have demonstrated an independent variable need not have a direct impact on the
outcome variable to establish mediation (Hayes, 2013; but see Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011).
As such, while it is clear the manipulation of diversity ideologies had no direct impact on
prejudice (either explicit racial bias or symbolic racism), it is still possible the effect of
colorblindness vs. multiculturalism had an indirect impact on prejudice, carried only through
outgroup perspective taking.
Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro for SPSS was used to test for evidence of such
mediation, and analyses were conducted with 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals based on
5000 bootstrap samples (variables were mean centered). As shown in Figure 1, the indirect effect
of multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on explicit racial bias through responses in the
perspective-taking scenario was positive and significant, b = 1.95, SE = 0.69, 95% CI [0.81,
3.60]. Thus, multiculturalism reduced participants’ likelihood of taking the perspective of the
Black target, and this reduction in perspective taking indirectly increased explicit racial bias. As
shown in Figure 2, the indirect effect of multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on
symbolic racism through responses in the perspective-taking scenario was also positive and
significant, b = 0.20, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.08, 0.33]. Multiculturalism therefore reduced
participants’ likelihood of taking the perspective of the Black target, and this reduction in
perspective taking indirectly increased symbolic racism. Because no other proposed mediators
were significantly affected by the diversity ideology manipulation, no further mediation analyses
were conducted.
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Discussion
The aim of the present work was to examine an underlying psychological process of how
the diversity ideologies of colorblindness and multiculturalism impact prejudice among Whites. I
hypothesized that, compared to colorblindness, multiculturalism would decrease prejudice
through a serial mediation process involving increased perceptions of difference (vs. similarity)
and, in turn, greater outgroup perspective taking. To test this prediction, participants were
randomly assigned to one of two essay conditions espousing the benefits of colorblindness or
multiculturalism for improving interethnic relations in society. Participants then completed
several dependent measures capturing perceptions of similarity vs. difference (using both visual
and interpersonal judgments), outgroup perspective taking (in an egocentrism task and
perspective-taking scenario), and prejudice (operationalized as explicit racial bias and symbolic
racism). Results suggest that, contrary to hypotheses, the only significant effect of the
colorblindness vs. multiculturalism manipulation was on reduced tendencies to take the
perspective of a Black target in an imagined scenario. Moreover, results suggest that (compared
to colorblindness) the effect of multiculturalism on reduced outgroup perspective taking, in turn,
increased explicit racial bias and symbolic racism. To be clear, these effects on explicit racial
bias and symbolic racism were not direct, but rather indirect and carried entirely through reduced
tendencies to take the perspective of a Black target.
The present research failed to find evidence that colorblindness and multiculturalism
facilitate a particular comparative focus—either on similarities or differences. This is rather
interesting given strong conceptualizations of colorblindness as primarily similarity-oriented and
multiculturalism as difference-oriented (Neville et al., 2013; Plaut, 2002, 2010; Rosenthal &
Levy, 2010; cf. Park & Judd, 2005). It is difficult to conclude whether this means colorblindness

30
and multiculturalism—as ideologies—do not differ in their focus on similarity vs. difference, or
if the operationalizations of perceived similarity vs. difference in the present work were not
sensitive enough to capture the effect of diversity ideologies on comparative processes. The
present research also failed to replicate several published findings, including the effect of
multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on reduced egocentrism and increased outgroup
perspective taking (Todd & Galinsky, 2012), as well as the effect of multiculturalism on reduced
explicit racial bias (e.g., Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; but see Correll et al., 2008; Wolsko et al.,
2000). The current findings suggest the opposite effect, that is, multiculturalism (compared to
colorblindness) decreased the likelihood of taking the perspective of a Black target. Moreover,
this reduced outgroup perspective taking, in turn, indirectly increased explicit racial bias and
symbolic racism.
This indirect effect on prejudice, however, should be interpreted with caution. Some
researchers and statisticians (e.g., Hayes, 2013) would agree these results provide enough
statistical evidence to suggest multiculturalism indirectly increased prejudice through reduced
outgroup perspective taking. However, other researchers and statisticians have articulated
compelling arguments that would question such an interpretation. A plausible alternative
explanation is that the significant indirect effect of multiculturalism on greater prejudice through
reduced outgroup perspective taking is simply due to the strong correlation between responses
for the perspective-taking scenario and the measures of explicit racial bias and symbolic racism
(for an in-depth explanation, see Fiedler et al., 2011). More unbiased tests of mediation involve
experimentally manipulating the independent variable and measuring its effect on the proposed
mediator, and then manipulating the proposed mediator and measuring its effect on the
dependent variable (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).
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If one were to take this potential limitation seriously, the present work is left with only
one unexpected (albeit significant) finding: the effect of multiculturalism (compared to
colorblindness) on reduced tendencies to take the perspective of a Black target. This effect was
robust, small-to-medium in size, and appeared somewhat stronger in the MTurk sample
compared to the undergraduate sample. However, there was no significant interaction between
condition and sample on outgroup perspective taking, suggesting the effect was independent of
sample type. What is it about multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) that reduced
participants’ likelihood of outgroup perspective taking? If perceived similarities are what
facilitate perspective taking and the overarching focus of multiculturalism is on intergroup
differences, it would be reasonable to assume the difference-focus of multiculturalism is what
reduced the likelihood of outgroup perspective taking. Yet, this conclusion is difficult to reach
given there was no evidence the diversity ideology manipulation affected perceived similarity vs.
difference—at least as it was operationalized in the current research.
Examining Alternative Explanations: Open-ended Responses and Stereotype Activation
Given the only significant result in the present work was the effect of diversity ideologies
on outgroup perspective taking, it may be beneficial to understand (or at least further speculate)
why multiculturalism reduced the likelihood of perspective taking in the imagined scenario. The
standard manipulation of diversity ideologies (see Wolsko et al., 2000) used here and in previous
research requires participants to write out several benefits of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism,
but rarely have these open-ended responses been examined. What follows is not an exhaustive
list based on formal text analysis, but a general overview of the themes that appeared (at least
several times) among participants’ responses in the colorblind and multicultural conditions.
Participants generally mentioned colorblindness would (1) promote unification within the
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United States and create an image of strength to the outside world, (2) reduce fighting, riots, and
violence both within the United States and abroad (e.g., lessening the frequency of terrorist
attacks); (3) strongly reduce bias against minority groups, including prejudice, stereotyping, and
discrimination; (4) reduce racial tension and anxiety about race more generally, (5) promote
equality and greater opportunities for all, (6) increase openness to different viewpoints,
perspectives, and diversity; (7) benefit companies and save money for the economy, (8) allow
people to focus on more pressing problems at the societal level (e.g., healthcare, the elderly, the
poor, the opiod crisis), and (9) generally improve the happiness of people.
In the multicultural condition, participants generally mentioned multiculturalism would
(1) promote unity, belongingness, and shared goals that would both strengthen the United States
and promote harmonious relationships with other countries; (2) promote cultural and genetic
diversity and allow people to recognize the strengths, weaknesses, and commonalities of
different groups; (3) understand and accept different viewpoints and perspectives (particularly
those of racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants) and become more tolerant, empathic, openminded, “worldly,” and adaptive to change; (4) reduce protests and conflict; (5) end racial
tension, racism, ethnocentrism, and White dominance/nationalism; (6) create opportunities for
new jobs and innovation, diversify the economy (including new food, art, and clothes), and
increase trade with other cultures; and (7) generally improve happiness and trust among people.
A cursory examination of the open-ended responses indicates the themes participants
discussed were relatively similar between conditions, despite colorblindness and
multiculturalism being conceptualized as rather different approaches to diversity. Interestingly,
although participants in both conditions mentioned colorblindness and multiculturalism would be
beneficial in reducing intergroup bias, such beliefs appeared far more frequent in the colorblind
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condition. It should also be noted that in addition to providing open-ended responses,
participants were asked to select responses—presumably written by other participants—that were
similar to their own. One option in the multiculturalism condition seemed particularly relevant to
the significant effect on the perspective-taking scenario. Here, approximately 43% of participants
picked the statement, “Multiculturalism helps groups with communication. Differing viewpoints
can be hard to grasp and explaining these logically can be beneficial to all groups.” If a
considerable portion of those in the multiculturalism condition believed the perspectives of other
groups are “hard to grasp,” it may suggest participants’ reduced likelihood of taking the
perspective of the Black target was merely because his perspective was unable to be truly
understood.
Even if multiculturalism reduced the likelihood of perspective taking in the imagined
scenario, why did it have no effect on the egocentrism task—when both measures included
targets from racial outgroups? An answer to this question may be found in research suggesting
colorblindness and multiculturalism also differentially affect stereotyping. Multiculturalism
emphasizes the importance of intergroup differences and relying on group categories, whereas
colorblindness de-emphasizes intergroup differences altogether (e.g., Plaut, 2002, 2010). As
such, research has shown that multiculturalism generally increases stereotyping and the liking of
stereotypical (vs. counterstereotypical) minority group members, whereas colorblindness
generally decreases stereotyping and increases the liking of counterstereotypical (vs.
stereotypical) minority group members (Gutierrez & Unzuetta, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2000; but
see Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007; for a review, see Rattan & Ambady, 2013).
If participants in the multiculturalism condition were primed to rely on intergroup
categories, it is possible they relied rather strongly on stereotypical information activated in the
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perspective-taking scenario. Here, participants are told to imagine they “are having a
disagreement” with a somewhat unhappy-looking Black target. To the extent that this scenario
activated stereotypical knowledge about the hostility or aggression of Blacks (e.g., Devine,
1989), the resulting threat or anxiety among participants may have thwarted desires to take the
perspective of the target (Todd, Forstmann, Burgmer, Brooks, & Galinsky, 2015). Other work
suggests that when attempting to estimate the perspective of another, group stereotypes are often
salient and highly accessible pieces of information that people consider (for a review, see Epley
& Caruso, 2009). Participants in the colorblind condition, however, were likely relying less on
intergroup categories and therefore experienced less stereotype activation during the perspectivetaking scenario. This may also explain why the effect of multiculturalism (compared to
colorblindness) on reduced outgroup perspective taking was not significant for the egocentrism
measure. Because the egocentrism task involved two presumably Black co-workers discussing
dinner recommendations, it was unlikely that any threatening stereotypes were activated among
those in the multiculturalism condition. Thus, the effect of multiculturalism on reduced outgroup
perspective taking in the perspective-taking scenario may have been a function of the way the
measure was operationalized, rather than any true effect of multiculturalism on perspective
taking more broadly.
(Re-)Considering Similarities, Differences, and Perspective Taking
Over the years, research has made important distinctions regarding perspective taking—
not only among the various forms of perspective taking (i.e., cognitive, affective, and
visuospatial; e.g., see Batson, 2017; Davis, 1983; Erle & Topolinski, 2017; Ford, 1979; Stephan
& Finlay, 1999)—but also regarding the psychological antecedents of perspective taking.
Traditionally, research has suggested similarity, including perceiving closeness, a bond, and
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“we-feeling” (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Stotland, 1969), is what primarily facilitates greater
perspective taking. Indeed, in classic work on the empathy-altruism hypothesis (e.g., Batson,
Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981), researchers experimentally manipulated affective
perspective taking (i.e., empathy) by highlighting similarities between the participant and a
distressed target. Other researchers, however, have suggested that although perceived similarity
facilitates greater perspective taking, a focus on similarity ultimately generates a more biased,
inaccurate, and egocentric perspective of another. In an impressive program of research, multiple
studies have shown that perceived differences are indeed necessary to adjust beyond one’s own
perspective and more accurately reflect the perspective of another (Epley, 2008; Epley & Caruso,
2009; Todd et al., 2011).
What remains unclear in this literature is under what conditions perceived similarity
facilitates greater perspective taking, and under what conditions perceived difference does. As of
yet, current research does not have a clear answer to this question, and more work is needed to
understand potential moderating factors. One possibility is the role of anxiety or perceived threat
on the effect of similarities vs. differences and perspective taking. Research suggests that when
people are feeling anxious, uncertainty appraisals cause them to make fewer adjustments to their
own perspective and adopt a more egocentric view of the other (Todd et al., 2015). When anxiety
or threat is high, people should also be less likely to expend the cognitive energy necessary to
differentiate their own perspective from that of a dissimilar other. In other words, perceived
differences are likely to engender the cognitive adjustment necessary for accurate perspective
taking, but only when anxiety or threat are minimal.
Epley and colleagues (2008, 2009) do not outline moderating factors of the effect of
perceived similarity vs. difference on perspective taking, but instead delineate a general process
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of perspective taking. First, the perspective-taking process must be activated, that is, the
individual must determine if they will even attempt to take the perspective of another. If the
individual has decided to take the perspective of another, they must then expend the cognitive
resources and energy necessary to adjust beyond their own perspective to more accurately reflect
the other (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Finally, if the individual has decided to take the
perspective of another and also expend the resources necessary to adjust beyond their own
perspective, they must then use the right information to reach an accurate reflection of another’s
perspective.
With this perspective-taking process in mind, it is possible that each measure of outgroup
perspective taking in the present research captured different stages of this process. In the
perspective-taking scenario, participants were essentially asked whether they would activate
their perspective-taking ability and consider the target’s perspective (if they ever found
themselves in such a situation, of course). Compared to the colorblind condition, participants in
the multiculturalism condition were less likely to activate their perspective-taking ability and
consider the viewpoint of the target. The egocentrism task, however, measured participants’
willingness to expend the cognitive energy necessary to adjust their own perspective from that of
another. The non-significant effect of the manipulation on the egocentrism task, then, may
merely reflect the fact that participants in the present research did not make it far enough to this
adjustment stage of the perspective-taking process (cf. Todd & Galinsky, 2012).
Strengths and Limitations
While most of the hypothesized effects were non-significant and the only significant
effect was in a direction contrary to hypotheses and published findings, there are several
methodological strengths to the present work that provide some confidence in the results. First
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and foremost, the present research—to my knowledge—is the most high-powered experiment
conducted to date on the psychological effects of diversity ideologies, employing over 340
participants from both undergraduate and non-student adult samples. Second, the manipulation
of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism in the present work used the original materials and
procedure of Wolsko and colleagues (2000), the standard manipulation across multiple studies in
this area (e.g., Correll et al., 2008; Morrison et al., 2010; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Todd &
Galinsky, 2012; Vorauer et al., 2009; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010, 2011; Wolsko et al., 2000).
Finally, many of the dependent measures used in the present work were taken from published
research or directly from the researchers themselves (when possible), including the visual picture
pairs (Markman & Gentner, 1996; T. Mussweiler, personal communication, August 21, 2014)
and interpersonal judgments (Mussweiler, 2001b), each measuring perceived similarity vs.
differences; the outgroup egocentrism task and perspective-taking subscale (Todd & Galinsky,
2012) used in the perspective-taking scenario, each measuring outgroup perspective taking; and
the explicit racial bias items (e.g., Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) measuring
prejudice (symbolic racism was added). Moreover, because there were two operationalizations of
each primary dependent variable, it ensured all constructs were captured rather broadly.
The strengths of the present research, however, must also be considered alongside its
notable limitations. As in some experiments involving diversity ideology manipulations, the
present work does not include a control or baseline condition. This makes it difficult to
determine—when compared against a control—if colorblindness and multiculturalism both
reduce prejudice but do not significantly differ from one another, a pattern of results that has
been supported by other research (e.g., Correll et al., 2008; Wolsko et al., 2000). Regarding
perspective taking in the present work, it is not clear whether colorblindness and multicultural
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both increase outgroup perspective taking, but colorblindness simply increases it more than
multiculturalism. It should also be noted that, although the perspective-taking scenario used the
same scale as past research (Study 1; Todd & Galinsky, 2012), it was contextualized as part of an
“imagined” or hypothetical situation. This likely made the measure more situationally realistic,
but also substantially changed it from its original use as an individual difference measure.
Finally, given the samples used in the present work are from the United States, the findings
should be interpreted contextually rather than as applicable to all countries and cultures, which
each have their own unique socio-cultural histories and status relations among groups.
In brief, one study on its own is likely insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the
overall effect of diversity ideologies on intergroup processes, most notably the outcomes of
intergroup perspective taking and prejudice discussed here. Future research should again attempt
to replicate these findings using both the original measures and additional ones, and appropriate
meta-analyses should be conducted to examine the overall effect of such published and
unpublished findings across the literature. If replication attempts and meta-analytic findings
reveal a different pattern of results, our understanding of social psychological theory and the
research that supports it should be reconsidered.
Conclusion
The aim of the present work was to examine—for the first time—an underlying
psychological mechanism of the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on prejudice
(among Whites, in particular). Results suggest that, compared to colorblindness, multiculturalism
significantly reduced the likelihood of outgroup perspective taking in an imagined scenario, and
this reduction in perspective taking may have indirectly increased explicit racial bias and
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symbolic racism. While the present work is an important step in this research, clearly more is
necessary.
Across the many studies examining diversity ideologies and their impact on intergroup
relations, the ultimate goal of social psychological theory and research has been to determine the
most effective method for promoting a fair, equitable, and harmonious society. However, too
often this examination takes a rather simplistic or mutually exclusive approach to answering the
question. Is it colorblindness or multiculturalism? Decategorization or recategorization? A
common ingroup or dual identities? Focusing too much on the benefits of one approach while
ignoring the benefits of others may indicate we are missing the opportunity to approach diversity
and intergroup relations in a nuanced way. Decades of research have shown that colorblindness,
multiculturalism, and the like each benefit some facet of intergroup relations, whether that be
reducing prejudice, stereotyping, or discrimination among majority group members, or making
minority groups feel more engaged or valued members of society. Acknowledging our
uniqueness as individuals does not necessarily mean our diversity as group members is
unimportant or problematic—just as acknowledging our intergroup differences does not
necessarily mean we are incapable of being unified under a common identity, goal, or shared
fate. Thus, the most effective approach for promoting a fair, equitable, and harmonious society
will likely require a solution as complex as the problem itself. Doing so requires a critical and
simultaneous evaluation of our individuality, intergroup diversity, and unity as human beings.
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Footnotes
Given the original materials of Mussweiler (2001b) describe a fellow student’s transition
to college, there did not appear to be a similar alternative for the non-student adult sample on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (e.g., not all participants have attended college). For this reason and
additional concerns of study time and monetary compensation, the interpersonal judgments were
not measured in the MTurk sample.
1
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Appendix – Tables
Table 1
Bivariate Correlations Among Dependent Variables (Full Sample)
Variable
1
2
3
4

5

6

1. Visual sim./diff.

--

2. Interpers. sim./diff. – N

.06

--

3. Interpers. sim./diff. - F

.07

.17*

--

4. Egocentrism

.08

.11

–.11

--

5. Perspective-taking

–.17**

–.04

.01

–.09ϯ

--

6. Explicit racial bias

.19**

.15ϯ

.10

.05

–.35***

--

.10ϯ

.17*

–.02

.06

–.40***

.40***

7. Symbolic racism

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ϯp < .10. Sim./diff. = similarity vs. difference, interpers.
sim./diff. – N = interpersonal “nights out” judgment, interpers. sim./diff. – F = interpersonal
“friends in town” judgment.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Results of t-tests Among Dependent Variables (Full Sample)
Colorblind
Multicultural
95% CI
Condition
Condition
Variable

M (SD)

M (SD)

t

d

Lower

Upper

Visual sim./diff.

3.90 (1.38)

4.04 (1.46)

−0.92

0.10

−0.44

0.16

Interpers. sim./diff. – N

5.59 (3.63)

5.99 (4.28)

−0.62

0.10

−1.67

0.88

Interpers. sim./diff. – F

31.87 (29.27)

28.48 (33.74)

0.66

0.11

−6.75

13.53

Egocentrism

3.64 (1.84)

3.77 (1.96)

−0.61

0.07

−0.53

0.28

Perspective-taking

5.78 (0.83)

5.45 (0.89)

3.52*

0.38

0.15

0.51

Explicit racial bias

5.66 (12.16)

6.37 (17.13)

−0.43

0.05

–3.88

2.48

Symbolic racism

3.28 (1.34)

3.41 (1.25)

−0.93

0.10

−0.41

0.15

Note. *p < .001. Colorblind condition, n = 173 for all analyses except interpersonal sim./diff.
variables (n = 78; undergraduate sample only). Multicultural condition, n = 168 for all analyses
except interpers. sim./diff. variables (n = 73; undergraduate sample only) and explicit racial bias
(n = 167). Sim./diff. = similarity vs. difference, interpers. sim./diff. – N = interpersonal “nights
out” judgment, interpers. sim./diff. – F = interpersonal “friends in town” judgment.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Results of t-tests Among Dependent Variables (Undergraduate
Sample)
Colorblind
Multicultural
95% CI
Condition
Condition
Variable

M (SD)

M (SD)

t

d

Lower

Upper

Visual sim./diff.

4.00 (1.28)

4.11 (1.29)

−0.52

0.09

−0.52

0.30

Interpers. sim./diff. – N

5.59 (3.63)

5.99 (4.28)

−0.62

0.10

−1.67

0.88

0.66

0.11

−6.75

13.53

Interpers. sim./diff. – F

31.87 (29.27) 28.48 (33.74)

Egocentrism

4.07 (1.88)

3.89 (1.88)

0.60

0.10

−0.42

0.79

Perspective taking

5.78 (0.80)

5.57 (0.83)

1.57

0.26

−0.05

0.47

Explicit racial bias

7.73 (11.22)

8.47 (15.98)

−0.33

0.05

–5.16

3.67

Symbolic racism

3.29 (1.06)

3.28 (0.91)

0.08

0.01

−0.31

0.33

Note. Colorblind condition, n = 78 for all analyses. Multicultural condition, n = 73 for all
analyses. Sim./diff. = similarity vs. difference, interpers. sim./diff. – N = interpersonal “nights
out” judgment, interpers. sim./diff. – F = interpersonal “friends in town” judgment.

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics and Results of t-tests Among Dependent Variables (MTurk Sample)
Colorblind
Multicultural
95% CI
Condition
Condition
Variable

M (SD)

M (SD)

t

d

Lower

Upper

Visual sim./diff.

3.81 (1.46)

3.98 (1.58)

−0.78

0.11

−0.61

0.26

Egocentrism

3.29 (1.72)

3.67 (2.02)

−1.42

0.20

−0.92

0.15

Perspective taking

5.79 (0.86)

5.37 (0.93)

3.24*

0.47

0.16

0.68

Explicit racial bias

3.97 (12.68)

4.73 (17.89)

−0.34

0.05

–5.22

3.70

Symbolic racism

3.28 (1.54)

3.52 (1.46)

−1.11

0.16

−0.67

0.19

Note. *p < .001. Colorblind condition, n = 95 for all analyses. Multicultural condition, n = 95 for
all analyses except explicit racial bias (n = 94). Interpersonal similarity vs. difference judgments
were not measured in this sample.
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Appendix – Figures

Figure 1. Mediation model depicting the effect of diversity ideologies on explicit racial bias
through self-reported likelihood of taking the perspective of a Black target. All path coefficients
are unstandardized.

Figure 2. Mediation model depicting the effect of diversity ideologies on symbolic racism
through self-reported likelihood of taking the perspective of a Black target. All path coefficients
are unstandardized.
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Appendix A1
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues
are a #1 concern for the United States. At the present time, we are experiencing a great deal of
conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed
our creed in the Declaration of Independence that "all men (and women) are created equal." That
is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first
and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United States. In order to
make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as a collection
of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin color
and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger
group, "Americans." Currently, we are spending a great many resources on conflict between
ethnic groups. If we can recognize our "sameness" we will be able to rechannel those resources
to work on difficult and important other problems within our society such as poverty, caring for
the elderly, and medical reform. Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to
appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same.
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Appendix A2
We have found that it helps to reflect on this issue of interethnic relations in order to make your
views more accessible. In the space below, please list four reasons that a unification among all
ethnic groups could potentially strengthen the United States. That is, by treating the members of
all ethnic groups similarly, how might this benefit the U.S?

1.

2.

3.

4.
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Appendix A3
The following are responses to the previous question written by other participants. This is simply
a collection of the reasons other participants listed for how a unification among all ethnic groups
could potentially strengthen the United States.
Please select the items that sound like your own responses (you may choose more than one).
1. More productive in business when people work well together.
2. A sense of patriotism when people are in one group.
3. Diminishes a barrier between races that blocks good communication.
4. Would solve many of the social problems and injustices that hurt us today.
5. There would be fewer hate crimes.
6. Less time and money used towards lawsuits due to racial issues.
7. When at war everyone would fight for everyone equally. For example, a white guy would
defend a black man as much as another white guy.
8. Would not need to spend as much government money on groups that help enforce a unified
USA.
9. We might become a more prosperous country with everyone working together.
10. More cooperation with other countries if they see that we are one not different races.
11. Less violence.
12. We will finally do what our constitution says, "all men are created equal."
13. Better sense of National Pride.
14. Free flow of ideas between races resulting in faster technological advances.
15. No more racial tensions would result in a happier and more productive society.
16. We would be stronger as a nation if U.S. citizens got along instead of turning things into
racial issues.
17. Not having to focus on ethnic issues frees up resources to focus on other issues.
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18. Equal access to work/other positions or facilities --wouldn't have to produce extra facilities
for separate but equal type policies.
19. People would be nicer to one another.
20. There would be less fighting between races.
21. Simplify politics.
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Appendix B1
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues
are a #1 concern for the United States. We are in the unique position of having many different
cultural groups living within our borders. This could potentially be a great asset. Different
cultural groups bring different perspectives to life, providing a richness in food, dress, music, art,
styles of interaction, and problem solving strategies. Each ethnic group within the United States
can contribute in its own unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of
harmony and complementarity among the various ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents,
as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we
validate the identity of each group and we recognize its existence and its importance to the social
fabric. We can allow each group to utilize its assets, to be aware of its own particular problems
or difficulties, and overall to live up to its potential. Thus, social scientists argue that
understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an essential
component of long-term social harmony in the United States.
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Appendix B2
We have found that it helps to reflect on this issue of interethnic relations in order to make your
views more accessible. In the space below, please list four reasons why multiculturalism is a
positive asset that could potentially strengthen the United States.

1.

2.

3.

4.
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Appendix B3
The following are responses to the previous question written by other participants. This is simply
a collection of the reasons other participants listed why multiculturalism is a positive asset that
could potentially strengthen the United States.
Please select the items that sound like your own responses (you may choose more than one).
1. Work together better.
2. Understand each other.
3. Less fighting.
4. Learn new cultures.
5. By interacting with people from different ethnic backgrounds we are more able to understand
stereotypes associated with other countries.
6. Exposed to new goods, clothing, music, traditions, etc.
7. Minorities don't feel that they are unimportant.
8. Helps with international negotiations.
9. Make society less boring.
10. Educate people in the US of other ethnic groups.
11. Might help cut down on crime.
12. Increase awareness of how certain groups are treated.
13. Multiculturalism brings to light different viewpoints and methods of dealing with issues. One
situation might be explained or dealt with in two separate ways by two different groups. This
enhances our pool of ideas.
14. Multiculturalism gives way to diverse activities that one would not experience otherwise.
15. Multiculturalism helps groups with communication. Differing viewpoints can be hard to
grasp and explaining these logically can be beneficial to all groups.
16. It refines people's sense of what being human is all about.
17. With all the knowledge present in our multicultural nation we could have a government
which accommodates the needs of a larger spectrum of the population.
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18. Provides diversity in social climate for future generations.
19. Gives people an open mind, that their culture isn't always the best or only culture.
20. Encourages bilingual communities.
21. Enables the settling of future immigrants.
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Appendix C
Christiane is a second-year college student at the University of Arkansas. Moving to a new city
in Fayetteville has been easy for her because she often moved during her childhood. Christiane
never had problems getting used to a new environment and saw moving as a challenge. At the
beginning of her studies she still went home regularly on weekends, but now that she has found
many new friends on campus and in Fayetteville, she typically spends her weekends here.
Christiane also likes her studies very much and has had few problems with exams.
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Appendix D
Below is a scenario depicting an interaction between two co-workers. Please read the following
text thoroughly, and then answer the questions that follow.

Tyrone and DeShawn are officemates at work. Tyrone asked DeShawn if he could recommend a
restaurant; his parents were in town and he wanted to take them to a good place.
DeShawn said, "You should go to this new Italian place, called Venezia. I just had dinner there
last night and it was awesome. Let me know how you all enjoy it!"
That evening, Tyrone and his parents ate there. Tyrone thought the food was unimpressive and
the service was mediocre. The next morning when Tyrone got to work, he sent this email to
DeShawn:
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Appendix E
I would find it difficult to see things from this person's perspective. (reverse-scored)
I would try to imagine “a day in the life” of this person.
I would try to better understand this person by imagining how things look from their perspective.
I probably wouldn't waste much time listening to this person. (reverse-scored)
I would try to look at their side of the argument to understand things better.
I would try to “put myself in their shoes” for a while.
Before immediately criticizing this person, I would try to imagine how I would feel if I were in
their place.
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